Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises
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- Author：Charles P. Kindleberger
- ISBN：1137525754
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Summary
The first edition of Charles Kindleberger's brilliant， panoramic history， published in 1978， summarized the pattern of market developments and the five stages in the evolution of a financial crisis。 Robert Z。 Aliber probes the sequence of four waves of crises that have involved more than forty countries since the early 1980s and shows that implosions of their banking systems do not follow from the decisions of 'bad actors' but instead are symptomatic of a dysfunctional international monetary arrangement。
With an updated Foreword from Robert M。 Solow and a new Afterword from Lord Robert Skidelsky， this seventh edition exemplifies the continued importance of Kindleberger's work and Aliber's ongoing examination of financial crises around the world。
With an updated Foreword from Robert M。 Solow and a new Afterword from Lord Robert Skidelsky， this seventh edition exemplifies the continued importance of Kindleberger's work and Aliber's ongoing examination of financial crises around the world。
Reviews
Jeff Greason
，
I liked the book a lot， as the author seems to make a sincere effort to address the data on panics and crashes and test the various theories about them rather than being doctrinaire and bashing the circumstances to fit a predetermined theory。 The result is illuminating but also a difficult read that advocates for no clear position。 On the other hand that is in part the message of the book -- that circumstances alter cases， and that no rule will really work to stabilize matters; as any rule-based I liked the book a lot， as the author seems to make a sincere effort to address the data on panics and crashes and test the various theories about them rather than being doctrinaire and bashing the circumstances to fit a predetermined theory。 The result is illuminating but also a difficult read that advocates for no clear position。 On the other hand that is in part the message of the book -- that circumstances alter cases， and that no rule will really work to stabilize matters; as any rule-based intervention changes the behavior of speculators （"moral hazard"） who count on future intervention。 Worth it if you're interested in the subject。 。。。more
Lili Kaneva
，
The subject is intriguing and the author has a respectable pile of knowledge。 The thing that made reading it so difficult is that it simply does not have a clear train of thought - it is now chronological and every crash is an example of many chapters。 It is a real Jambalaya of examples。 Not easy to comprehend。
Dinesh Perera
，
An interesting read that is well-paced and exposes the reader to various financial crises throughout history。 Please find below the notes that I made from the book。Manias， Panics， and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises Chapter 1: Financial crises are neverendingMarkets drive incentives towards profits。 Given high uncertainty investors seek secure assets for revenue streams。 In the instance of uncertainty， the historic & predicted behaviour of monetary institutions play a large role in wider An interesting read that is well-paced and exposes the reader to various financial crises throughout history。 Please find below the notes that I made from the book。Manias， Panics， and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises Chapter 1: Financial crises are neverendingMarkets drive incentives towards profits。 Given high uncertainty investors seek secure assets for revenue streams。 In the instance of uncertainty， the historic & predicted behaviour of monetary institutions play a large role in wider behaviour。Credit inflows drive the creation of tall buildings。 Markets do not see systemic risk。 Ostentatiousbehaviour is a sign of a problem。Asset bubbles are a monetary phenomenon driven by large growth in credit。 Real estate is highly susceptible to credit-driven bubbles。Money is a public good but monetary arrangements can be carried out by private parties。 Incentives to circumvent regulation are very high。Regulators should act to prevent deflation but create enough uncertainty to instil caution in market participants。Chapter 2: Anatomy to typical crisisThe Minsky model predicts that credit growth is pro-cyclical。 Optimism & pessimism both have a self-fulfilling impact on market participants in terms of credit creation。 In boom periods speculative highly leveraged borrowers increase who during downturns become distressed sellers。Minsky's taxonomy on finance•tHedge finance- anticipated operating income greater than interest payments & scheduled principal payments。•tSpeculative finance- anticipated operating income greater than interest on indebtedness but requires new loans to pay down principal payments。•tPonzi group- anticipated operating income lover than interest payments。Following the leader， phenomena are very common in the growth sector of the economy。 Global credit flows can drive speculate booms & busts。 Through systems of arbitrage， investors ensure that international prices for similar goods globally remain in tandem。Currency speculation is highly profitable but has a tendency for creating big winners and equally big losers。 It is easy for real estate booms to drive net rental income below the interest payments required to maintain the property。Chapter 3: Speculative maniasA 'mania' is a loss of connection with reality。 The capital markets behave on the assumption that markets are rational。 Investor demand for a particular asset class can have a self-inducing impact on the short term return of that asset class。4 understandings of rational•tMost investors behave rationally mat of the time。•tAll investors behave rationally most of the time。•tMarket participants operate on the same intelligence。•tAll investors behave rationally all the time。Fixed-rate exchange systems were historically touted as bringing rationality to international capital flows。 New theory pushes a rational market perspective。Rationality in most economic models is an 'a priori' assumption; based on deduction from given principles。ThemesDusenberry effect: increase consumption with a rise in income but do not decrease consumption with a fall in income。Bandwagon effects: excessive support for the most probable winner。Greater fool theory: pass on the inflated asset to another party before the bubble implodes。Banks do not have a new of real interest rates while borrowers do。Bucket shops: undertake to buy & sell orders with no capacity to fulfil them in the hope that outsiders bets will be proved wrong。Boiler shops: hustle naive investors by inflating stock and then slowly dumping itoff on them。On inflated stock values: 'all fictitious value must be a loss to some person。。。 the only way to prevent it is to sell out and so let the Devil take the hindmost。'Chapter 4: Credit expansionIncreases in credit supply do not necessarily equate to manias but every mania would be driven by a targeted growth in credit。 Systems of delayed payment are highly conducive to expansions in credit。Meaningful monetary expansion is part of a systemic growth within a system rather than due to random and external events。What exactly is money？The definitions of money have significant implications on the quality of economic analysis。•tM1: Currency + Demond deposits•tM2: M1 + Time deposits•tM3: M2 + Highly liquid securitiesIn developed economies， there are highly liquid assets substitutable for money that are only inferior when it comes to collective payment。 It is easier toaccumulate debt than it is to accumulate wealth。Regulatory requirements on the quality of debt have huge implications on yield。 Junk bonds may offer high yield， and only really be viable during periods of large savings requirements。 The availability of credit drives business decisions。 The quality of debt is inversely related to the quantity of debt。In a system of endorsed cheques even people of disrepute are treated as creditworthy。 Regulations are quickly circumvented。Chapter 5。 Bubble about to bustThe change of mindset from optimism to pessimism is what drives bubbles to bust。 There are early signs that a bubble is about to burst; in the US the mortgage originating fins in 2006 were already showing high rates of bankruptcy。Bailouts are incredibly good mechanisms for wiping out equity。 Regulators are wary of the long term consequences of bailouts。 Government can quell fears by being transport on their own forecasts。The Bubble Act of 1749 was actually formulated to protect the bubble that was the South Sea company。 Preventing other firms from raising capital helps existing firms find investment。Central Bank credibility has a huge impact on the functioning of markets。 Premonitions of market failure can be self-fulfilling。 Japan was able to stave off bank runs despite the negative mark-to-market values of their banking system due to strong assurances that depositors would be made whole by government bailouts。Theoretically safe price arbitration strategies like taking advantage of price differentials on varying tenures of risk-free debt only work if one can remain solvent。 The Federal Reserve can force banks to take equity positions in their borrowers。The sudden cutting of credit， for instance from a change in credit policy， can cause a chain reaction of events that cause a bubble to burst。 Fiddling with discount rates only works when there is confidence。 The IMF worsened the crisis in Indonesia in 1997 by causing uncertainty in the health of institutions the governmentweren't forced to assist。 Monetary easing can cause bubbles elsewhere in the economy。Chapter 6: Conspicuous consumptionTall buildings and other projects showcasing excessive spending are symptomatic of asset bubbles。 Things that would otherwise seem wasteful， in periods of excess are commonplace。 Excessively tall buildings very quickly get into diseconomies of scale。 Tall buildings in regions of large land availability are significantly concerning。Changes in stock prices are predictive with a high degree of false positives of a pending economic recession。 Changes in the prices of speculative assets are closely tied to the cash availability of speculating communities。Real estate defaults can exceed the defaults of other highly speculative fields during downturns。 Real estate booms can draw capital flow from other productive sectors of the economy， e。 g- in Japan when industrial firms ventured into real estate。 Real estate is fertile ground for creative accounting。Chapter 7- Frauds & The credit cyclePeople are likely to retain funds with institutions offering high yields。 Bernie Madoff was successful due to feeder firms he incentivized to route funds into his scheme。 It is commonplace for firms to misrepresent the value of their inventories， investments， & profit rates。 When profit rates are rising investors are likely to retain funds with the business and may even borrow to meet personal expenses as opposed to drawing down on their investment funds。 Corruption is hard to measure。Audit firms are easily captured as their financial incentives are to the provision of services to the company。 Borrowers can be made to lie when credit is readily available。 People involved in the compilation of financial information are cognizant of the fact that the information is not true。Market strategists are not incentivized to publicly predict a drop in share values。 White-collar crime has a low conviction rate。 Traders can easily circumvent rules and are dangerous if they have a tendency to double down on losses。 Feeder firms and advisory agents can knowingly sell bad or already failed financial products。There is more theft in terms of loan applications from a bank than there is in terms of bank heists。 Highly inflated appraisal values especially in retail for collateral purposes assist in the fraud。 Favouritism towards certain borrowers is not noticed in times of euphoria。 Market participants in certain instances seem to want to be deceived。Savings expectations of regular returns drive reporting the behaviour to 'smoothen' out financial earnings。 Mutual funds do not treat all customers equally and can have insider dealings with larger clients to boost returns/channel funds。 Boiler shops are common when investors want to hold growth stocks。Journalism is easily bought and does not play enough of an adversarial role。Chapter 8: International contagionInternational collapses in confidence precipitate through trading & investment partners and can be caused without any external shock to the economy。 Thelaw of one price brings about the equalisation of prices globally to the costs （freight， customs， transport）。Global contagion is asymmetric with the crisis in counties with hard currencies impacting more so than crises in less important locales。 Countries compete globally for investment flows and as such a reduction of investment flows in one country can be driven by better prospects in another country。Currency debasement & selling to ignorant common people is more profitable than actual entrepreneurial endeavour。 Historically markets with an information edge tend to do better。 In times of bust activity on the exchanges crashes。Systems to increase credit with weak regulatory oversight can drive booms & thus more severe busts。 Repayment over extended periods can cause losses to the creditor。Large institutional investors and their actions can have a huge impact on the confidence of markets。 'Get rich quick' schemes are always a cause for concern。Trading partners tend to develop complex investment flow mechanisms。 Positive growth prospects as for instance brought about by the discovery of gold drive expansion in credit bases which can precipitate regionally。Suspensions of convertibility， historically into gold， drive collapses。 Competing demand for credit can hurt businesses in the weaker sector/locality。 There is global contagion in a loss of confidence。Banks drive up the value of the things that they have a stake in。Chapter 9: Bubbles from other bubblesCountries are increasingly facing concurrentbubbles in financial markets with similar characteristics。The 3 components helping international contagion of bubbles•tA large pool of funds to be lent。•tA shock driving behaviour towards higher anticipated returns。•tA welcoming regulatory environment。Payments imbalances driven by trade imbalances， investment inflows， or lending inflows cause large increases in the money supply。Barks like high yielding assets in hard currencies &therefore are willing to expand dollar-denominated debts to so-called 'emerging markets'The need to recycle' petro- dollars' allowed counties to finance a much larger trade deficit asoil-exporting nations invest in international reserve assets。Under the current system of trade industrial countries have much larger current account surpluses。 Trade surpluses have to be met with trade deficits elsewhere。Policies helping create trade surpluses areprotected by the profits of the export-oriented firms。 Export surplus countries are more likely to have policies facilitating money outflows to dampen upward pressure onthe currency。Industrial policy can erode savings returns for households。 Bank lending to the property sector can have self-fulfilling properties in terms of capital appreciation。 It is even possible for individuals to have cash outflows from the property investment as rental proceeds exceed interest expenditure。Securing ridiculous appraisals of property values is commonplace and a means to rob from the banking system。International cities are tied to open flows of international capital。 Coastal Chinese towns do better than other regions within China in the recent multi-decade growth phase。Trade agreements facilitating low-cost sourcing bring about international investment flows。 Privatization brings about internationalinvestment flows。Venture capital firm's make money by selling growth prospects。 There is a lot of capital seeking high returns。 IPOs can be structured， even at cost to existing shareholders or against the goal of raising as much money as possible， to create price pops， an increase in traded value over the subscription price。Bank liquidity can seep into capital markets。Capital flow cause issues for maintaining pegged exchange rates。 Credit bubbles can be self-perpetuating growth schemes in the short run。Chapter 10: Policy responsesCountries have put in place systems to prevent a sudden shortage of liquidity that would otherwise trigger a solvency crisis in firms。 The Austrian school of economics holds the view that the best solution to a crisis is to let it run its course。 The school asserts that over time the economy would adjust to the decline in household wealth， de-capitalization of banks， and slowdown in business and household spending。 Too big to fail works along the same lines of deposit insurance as it makes participants less wary of placing cash in institutions as they assume that a larger institution would guarantee the funds。Internationally there have been movements to strengthen bank capital structures with the imposition of a similar risk-based capital requirement for banks across countries。Regulators have been called on to forestall lending in euphoric periods that may cause a financial crisis。The argument that the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act caused the International Financial crisis fails to explain why it is that banks outside the US jurisdiction and in other periods。Manias are macro phenomena driven by large growth in credit whereas regulation is a micro-phenomenon that only captures a small part of the broader economy。Liquidity shortfalls are supposed to be self-clearing by the ability of firms to raise rates to encourage others to lend to them。 The banking sector can reduce speculation in commodities and securities by increasing deposit rates。Businesses can continue to operate despite having wiped out all shareholder capital as was the case with AIG。 During liquidity crises， interest rates for private borrowers may seem excessively high as there is a loss of trust in the system which by its very nature is highly interconnected。 The government can normalize rates in crises by issuing guarantees to the markets which have historically crashed borrowing costs。Institutions with positive net worth can be wiped out by not being able to borrow against their securities。 Temporary rises in rates should under certain conditions allow for there to be large inflows of capital looking to profit from the high rates。The Austrian school notes that there is always an incentive for authorities to intervene during a crisis as authorities tend to be political and driven by short-term political objectives。Closing markets helps market participants return to a state of sanity during a panic。 Bank runs can be stopped by slowly disbursing funds， bank holidays， and deposit guarantees。 Systemic failure by bank lending can be extended by banks choosing not to recognize loan losses which are assisted by the forbearance of bank examiners。Excessive competition on bank rates can be exacerbated during a crisis and systems to ensure that banks accept each other's papers helps reduce competition on this front。Crises can also be stopped through the conversion of debt obligations to equity forms of capital。 Deposit guarantees are abused by wealthy people to guarantee a high rate of return。The US Banking system is unique in that banks are more freely allowed to form and historically were even allowed to issue their own currency。 Government bad loan agencies can reduce the eventual losses to the taxpayer by forcing a quicker and more managed resolution to the crisis。 Speculation helps cause crisis and can extend to even the most minor of asset classes。Chapter 11: Domestic lender of last resortThe development of the lender of last resort has come about historically as the market gets used to systems of credit and then suddenly there is a loss of confidence in the system and this precipitates a crisis。 Over time various institutions which in certain instances were not even empowered legally to do so have stepped in to issue a credit to the market。The role of the Central Bank in any country was historically viewed as being either to defend the value of the currency which in the current day can not be unentwined from the health of the financial system。 Bagehot’s Lombard Street in 1873 popularized the concept of a lender of last resort。A lender of last resort brings about the problem of whether economic agents should focus their concerns on a current pandemic or the next boom made possible by a lender of last resort。 Economic collapse can be brought about by small shortfalls in confidence。The lender of last resort must be wary of setting a precedent by bailing out industries with a sudden borrowing requirement。 It is difficult to set out hard rules on the actions of a lender of last resort。 The lender of last resort brings about the question of who should hold reserves and in what quantity？ If an institution has been entrusted with the position as a lender of last resort， then the institutions that it insures might take the position that they do not have to maintain proper liquidity。 Lenders of last resort by the interests brought about by the role want to have a monopoly on the issuance of currency。 The decision to act as a lender of last resort is a political one that has implications on regional balances in the economy。 Regional banks may be less likely to be bailed out than one located in close proximity to the lender of last resort。Requiring endorsements of bills of exchange do not tend to work as they are easily obtained with people of disrepute。 。。。more
Hrishi
，
Believe the other reviews when they say this book reads like a textbook。 Even going into it expecting a technical book devoid of storytelling however， I ran up into another problem: it's been around to long！I listened to the 7th edition on Audible and have a paperback of the 6th edition at hand。 What looks to have happened is this book has lost whatever personality it might have had in original form to revisions， updates， and layers of prologue preface epilogue afterword add-on chapters and what Believe the other reviews when they say this book reads like a textbook。 Even going into it expecting a technical book devoid of storytelling however， I ran up into another problem: it's been around to long！I listened to the 7th edition on Audible and have a paperback of the 6th edition at hand。 What looks to have happened is this book has lost whatever personality it might have had in original form to revisions， updates， and layers of prologue preface epilogue afterword add-on chapters and whatnot。 It's repetitive， boring and most frustratingly， not even chronological。 It's full of facts， but none are fun facts and they're repeated at nauseum in chapters that seem to not know there are other chapters spouting the same facts！The thesis send to be that we need an international lender of last resort （despite concerns about moral hazard） because capitalism is inherently going to swing between periods of exuberance and panic。 Fine。 Point taken。 But did you really have to write so much dull prose to make it？ 。。。more
Cajsa
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In theory， this should have been a 5 ⭐️ read for me but the editing was just v poor: this could’ve been 250 pages long！ It’s also dry as the desert and super repetitive - what a shame！
Broken Bear
，
It gets a five because of how comprehensive it is， but this is not a delicate read， it could certainly pass for a University textbook。
Junior
，
Information detail overload！ Could be rearranged to common elements like for example a surge in easy credit always leads creditors not being able get get new loans to pay off old loans。Allowing financial companies to get around regional rule always lead to excess payment issues elsewhere which always came back to negatively affect the original country。
Kc
，
This is a hard read - there is no levity。 This book is focused on analyzing specific features of bubble cycles。 As Kindleberger tries to pull together and give analysis of how those features were represented across time， it's easy to get lost in the details。 The text is difficult to read due to its repetitive， very dry writing style。I made it through by taking notes to follow the process。 Such good information lost in an overally academic text style。 This is a hard read - there is no levity。 This book is focused on analyzing specific features of bubble cycles。 As Kindleberger tries to pull together and give analysis of how those features were represented across time， it's easy to get lost in the details。 The text is difficult to read due to its repetitive， very dry writing style。I made it through by taking notes to follow the process。 Such good information lost in an overally academic text style。 。。。more
Shan P S
，
This book draws from history of all major financial panics in the past 500 years。 The enormous effort undertaken by the author to read and distill the character of each panic is evident。 It is not easy to read， since the book is written like a doctoral thesis， than a regular 'business' book。 Every paragraph in the book has references dating back to older books， some of which are more than 100 years old。 Recommended for advanced readers of stock market history。 This book draws from history of all major financial panics in the past 500 years。 The enormous effort undertaken by the author to read and distill the character of each panic is evident。 It is not easy to read， since the book is written like a doctoral thesis， than a regular 'business' book。 Every paragraph in the book has references dating back to older books， some of which are more than 100 years old。 Recommended for advanced readers of stock market history。 。。。more
Sing Chong Lee
，
Book on the history of the financial world it is a very dry book and take time to focus on it。
Matthew M
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After reading this book， you feel like we really should have figured this shit out by now。Since we haven't， making sure you're well aware of all of the warning signs of excess and mania while they're underway is critical。 After reading this book， you feel like we really should have figured this shit out by now。Since we haven't， making sure you're well aware of all of the warning signs of excess and mania while they're underway is critical。 。。。more
Leandro
，
This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers。 To view it， click here。 Lot of insight about bubbles and investor behaviour， but kinda disorganized， composition seemed a little twisted。
0VOID0
，
Some journalist from Instagram recommended。
Ben Peyton
，
This is a very detailed examination of the making of manias， panics， and crashes throughout the last 4oo years of economic history。 Kindleberger argues that recent crashes over the last 30-40 years are the result of a cycle of credit expansion that happens in a single country or multiple countries that leads to economic expansion and then exuberance and risky behavior and then a crash。 The reason for the expansion of credit happens for a lot of reasons but Kindleberger argues that much of it is This is a very detailed examination of the making of manias， panics， and crashes throughout the last 4oo years of economic history。 Kindleberger argues that recent crashes over the last 30-40 years are the result of a cycle of credit expansion that happens in a single country or multiple countries that leads to economic expansion and then exuberance and risky behavior and then a crash。 The reason for the expansion of credit happens for a lot of reasons but Kindleberger argues that much of it is due to cross-border investment flows from other countries that drive up the cost of a countries currency， assets， and real estate。 The increase in prices is usually too high and for too long and it results in a crash。 At which point capital flows to another economy。One thing I did not expect was the critical view the author had of the federal government's response to not save Lehman Brothers in the 2008 crisis。 Kindleberger shows that the government's response was not consistent across the crisis and the reason the government didn't save Lehman Brothers is not that it couldn't but because it wanted to make an example。 This backfired。 The government failed to predict that crisis in the credit markets forcing Lehman Brothers to fail created。 The very next day the government had to save AIG and the economic contraction caused by the credit crisis was the worst in generations。 Overall， I would recommend this book to anyone interested in economic history and who wishes to get a better understanding of recent crashes and older ones。 The book is dense in parts， and he repeats himselve a lot， but it is interesting。 。。。more
Cliff Hazell
，
I read 60 odd pages and fell asleep about 7 times。80% of what I read was repetition of the same point。Streams of dates and data points， and thin on observation or conclusions。Desperately in need of some editing， and some narrative arc。Definitely not recommended
Robin
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a 'favorite' book of David Rosenberg's as of 6/2020 on Barry Ritholtz MiB a 'favorite' book of David Rosenberg's as of 6/2020 on Barry Ritholtz MiB 。。。more
Ayman
，
Manias， Panics， and Crashes by Charles Kindleberger “There is nothing so disturbing to one's wellbeing and judgment as seeing a friend get rich” This is the reason for most speculative manias in history whether it’s commodities， merchandise， currencies， stocks， or real estate。 They all start by a few people getting rich on real beneficial investments， followed by a crowd of me-toos who drive valuation of these originally good investments to surrealistic bubble levels only to see them crashing an Manias， Panics， and Crashes by Charles Kindleberger “There is nothing so disturbing to one's wellbeing and judgment as seeing a friend get rich” This is the reason for most speculative manias in history whether it’s commodities， merchandise， currencies， stocks， or real estate。 They all start by a few people getting rich on real beneficial investments， followed by a crowd of me-toos who drive valuation of these originally good investments to surrealistic bubble levels only to see them crashing and burning afterwards。 The fuel of these speculations is liquidity， I。e。， money。 But money is not only limited to the cash in one’s pocket。 In economic speak this is money1 or M1 for short。 Another source of cash， I。e。， M2， is available credit such as bank or private loans。 Furthermore， M3 could be assets that can sold and converted to cash， and so on。 The higher the number next to M， the lower its liquidity。 Some economists went as high as M7， but it can be safely assumed that every M-i has a less liquid but available M-j 。 The problem with money is it is always increasing no matter how much governments try to limit it。 An example of that is like saying: “Last year I wasn’t worth a cent， but now I owe 2 million dollars！” In a speculative boom， liquidity from all types of money drain to the speculative sinkhole leaving other economic activities high and dry。 The bust can happen either because of liquidity shortages or when the valuation bubble bursts or， most commonly， both。 For example， in the 2008 financial crisis， real estate devaluation and mortgage defaults dried up liquidity so much that even well-functioning companies couldn’t finance their profitable operations that has absolutely nothing to do with real estate。 Finally， the book compared financial crashes in the past 300 years in terms of the effectiveness of Government response。 It evaluated the role of the “Lender of last resort” performed in the past by private lenders， then governments， and finally by autonomous national central banks。 It’s interesting that an absolute guarantee of such role creates moral hazard and encourages reckless financial speculation while the complete absence of it could result in prolonged and painful economic depression。 It’s another Goldilocks of not too much and not too little response。 2020 presents a similar challenge as governments struggle deciding how much money to throw at the economic disaster caused by COVID。 The US， for example， injected $3 trillion of liquidity in the first wave from March to May and are starting to inject more as we are going to the second wave。 A great book， but a very tough read。 。。。more
Zulfiqar Khan
，
A dense but brilliant book highlighting financial crises prior to 2008。 The book goes back into the 1600s and covers the Tulip Bulb Bubble， the South Sea Bubble， the Mississippi Bubble， the stock market bubble of the 1920s， and many more， culminating in the tech stock bubble of the late 90s。 Some of the most interesting chapters are on domestic lender of last resort and international lender of last resort。 Not the easiest read， nevertheless it is packed with information and essential for those s A dense but brilliant book highlighting financial crises prior to 2008。 The book goes back into the 1600s and covers the Tulip Bulb Bubble， the South Sea Bubble， the Mississippi Bubble， the stock market bubble of the 1920s， and many more， culminating in the tech stock bubble of the late 90s。 Some of the most interesting chapters are on domestic lender of last resort and international lender of last resort。 Not the easiest read， nevertheless it is packed with information and essential for those seeking to better understand how manias， panics and crashes develop。 。。。more
Chris
，
Hard to give a rough review on a book that is obviously packed with a lot of detail and written by a very smart and accomplished author。 However， I just flat out didn't enjoy this book。 While it's inherently dry by it's more scholarly nature， I feel there was a myriad of other ways to get the key points organized for the reader to process。 A lot of the time it seemed the historical anecdotes， of which there are just so so many， seemed like a thought that popped up and was included without much t Hard to give a rough review on a book that is obviously packed with a lot of detail and written by a very smart and accomplished author。 However， I just flat out didn't enjoy this book。 While it's inherently dry by it's more scholarly nature， I feel there was a myriad of other ways to get the key points organized for the reader to process。 A lot of the time it seemed the historical anecdotes， of which there are just so so many， seemed like a thought that popped up and was included without much thought to the overall flow， almost like a cutaway。 A lot of the time it felt like you had to either skim and move on or read a section twice。 I did learn a lot by simply Wikipedia-ing a lot of the events noted， which is almost required since the author seems to assume the reader knows a lot of the esoteric mini crises in Europe and the US from 1700-2000。 However there are a lot of great points and nuggets in the book that will always be relevant hundreds of years from now which is very impressive and is the reason this book is so reputable。 It is worth a read， but before doing so I would maybe temper the expectations of it being an exciting page turner of clearly organized and linear thought。 I wish I did！ 。。。more
Jacob Celermajer
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Dense and repetitive， a hard slog to get through
Franta
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The conclusion is: Lender of the last resort is indeed helpful in panics and crises。This book tells you all the ways banks fall - surely useful for the coming years！
Tasos Manouras
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OMG I am finally done。 Have never read a book that galvanizes its title to your soul as much as this has。 Neverending examples that seem to be repeating themselves over and over， transcending time， culture， political beliefs and geography。 More often than enough， the examples， well researched as they might be， seem to be portraying only parts of the problem。 Conclusions are easy to be drawn when an event has passed and been thoroughly documented。 Was expecting more conclusions as to what awaits OMG I am finally done。 Have never read a book that galvanizes its title to your soul as much as this has。 Neverending examples that seem to be repeating themselves over and over， transcending time， culture， political beliefs and geography。 More often than enough， the examples， well researched as they might be， seem to be portraying only parts of the problem。 Conclusions are easy to be drawn when an event has passed and been thoroughly documented。 Was expecting more conclusions as to what awaits us or more scientific evidence on the psychology behind this never ending cycle。 Would recommend it to any investor。 P。S。 His take on Bitcoin is not supported enough。 。。。more
Michael
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The conclusion is very sharply summarized in the introduction and for me was 80% of what i will take away。 This book would have been easier to follow if i had more awareness of the economic history is goes over。 Overall this book is very dry。
BrookeLynn
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This book has taught me a lot about the things that I now know that I don't know。 I'd be interested to come back to this book after I get more background knowledge and see how my understanding changes。 This book has taught me a lot about the things that I now know that I don't know。 I'd be interested to come back to this book after I get more background knowledge and see how my understanding changes。 。。。more
Rob Price
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Touted as a must read for anyone with an interest in global macro investing， I probably had too higher expectations。 It’s filled with quality financial history， which should provide useful references against which to compare current events。 Kindleberger， like his teacher Minsky， were students of credit cycles and the flow of global capital。 I enjoyed the way in which he sketched the linkages between the financial crises of the last 50 years。 From the inflationary 70s and the oil price shock of t Touted as a must read for anyone with an interest in global macro investing， I probably had too higher expectations。 It’s filled with quality financial history， which should provide useful references against which to compare current events。 Kindleberger， like his teacher Minsky， were students of credit cycles and the flow of global capital。 I enjoyed the way in which he sketched the linkages between the financial crises of the last 50 years。 From the inflationary 70s and the oil price shock of the early 80s， the Japanese 80s boom and its subsequent crash in 1990， the 90s East Asia boom and 1997 crash that followed with capital flooding into the US market， stoking the DotCom bubble。 The solutions of the past crisis often sow the seeds of the next… Kindlebergers analytical approach is a welcome addition to an Austrian Economist but its supplemental。 He implicitly places the responsibility for these cycles at the hands of central banks， banks and policymakers without explicitly obligating them to act more responsibly， which I see as a necessity。 I’ll keep it as a reference book， but I wasn’t enthralled。 Perhaps I just didn’t click with his writing style， even though I could display subtle comical undertones from time to time。 。。。more
Alexander Paul
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Reads like a textbook at times and also has a confusing timeline as it often jumps back and forth between economic catastrophes throughout global history。
Diana Sandberg
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I was so relieved to read reviews from other readers and find that apparently my brain had not suddenly turned to mush， that this book is indeed that impenetrable。 Many of the reviewers even have backgrounds in finance or economics （which I do not）， and most of them still found this， at best， a difficult read。 Once again， I was led astray by book jacket and publisher's puff， and， in this case， the forward， which actually had the face to praise the author's "hilarious anecdotes。。。elegant epigrams I was so relieved to read reviews from other readers and find that apparently my brain had not suddenly turned to mush， that this book is indeed that impenetrable。 Many of the reviewers even have backgrounds in finance or economics （which I do not）， and most of them still found this， at best， a difficult read。 Once again， I was led astray by book jacket and publisher's puff， and， in this case， the forward， which actually had the face to praise the author's "hilarious anecdotes。。。elegant epigrams， and。。。graceful turns of phrase"。 Puh-leeze。 I actually read further into this book than I wanted to， hoping to find any evidence of any of that。 Nope。 。。。more
Francisco
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Great book about financial history。 I would have given 5 stars if the author had included more numbers and charts。
Jeff Bower
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A must read for the serious stock market investor。
Kumail Akbar
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